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Russia’s current policy and associated expansion in the High North directly 
contrast the United States’ weak Arctic policy. To secure its objectives in the Arctic, the 
United States—which has constrained diplomatic, military and economic resources for 
foreign relations—must assess if Arctic investment is truly worthwhile. This thesis will 
examine the military dimension of Arctic expansion and assess the risk and overall 
investment of U.S. militarization against diplomatic agreements. Using Senturion 
modeling and simulation software via closed-loop capstone wargames, this thesis helps 
forecast potential implications of various U.S. Arctic policy avenues across the spectrum 
of known stakeholders and against each stakeholder’s stated or perceived preferences. 
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The Arctic High North is rapidly emerging as a geopolitical, military and 
economic strategic area of interest for a wide range of stakeholders and for a variety of 
reasons. The rapid melting of Arctic sea ice has triggered dramatic increases in 
exploration activities and interest in this resource-rich environment. The High North has 
experienced some of the most rapid, abrupt environmental changes on the planet over the 
past two decades and as such has become far more accessible and may shape the strategic 
arena for the foreseeable future.1 For instance, as the Northern Sea Route and Northwest 
Passage become more navigable, they will experience a dramatic increase in use; this 
means approximately two thirds of total world trade passing through the Suez Canal will 
be rerouted to the Northern Sea Route.2 This new ease of use in the High North oceanic 
passageways will increase the need for appropriate security measures within the region 
and present a new range of global challenges for stakeholders. 
While there are only five High North coastal states—the United States, Canada, 
Russia, Norway and Denmark (Greenland)—Arctic countries with direct geopolitical ties 
to the region also include Sweden, Finland and Iceland. Although there are high levels of 
international cooperation among the eight countries, the High North will continue to be 
an emerging security concern. Russia, for example, has followed through on 
announcements that it would increase military presence in the High North and has staked 
claim to territory below the ice’s surface. 
In order for the United States to execute three key lines of effort—advancing 
United States security interests; pursuing responsible Arctic region stewardship; and 
strengthening international cooperation, as outlined in the 2013 “National Strategy for the 
Arctic Region”—there must be a concerted effort to align actions and assets with outlined 
policies already in place.3 
                                                 
1 The University of Maine, Climate Change Institute (Orono, ME: University of Maine, 2016): 7. 
2 Study by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), 
http://worldmaritimenews.com/archives/161360/study-northern-sea-route-to-overpower-suez-canal/ 
3 White House, “National Strategy for the Arctic Region,” 2013. 
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Currently, the United States is not prepared to meet the demands of operating 
within the High North. The United States has only two heavy icebreakers (note: 2013 
mission needs statement dictates six); both have exceeded their 30-year service lives and 
one is completely nonoperational.4 In order to execute its three lines of effort within 
pending fiscal constraints, the U.S. must negotiate a balance of shared responsibility 
among regional stakeholders. 
This research incorporates stakeholder current capabilities, economic status and 
associated policies in order to populate Senturion with the categorical values required to 
represent each stakeholder. The assigned values are based on country proximity, power, 
position and overall influence as related to various issues centered in the High North area 
of concern. The Senturion modeling software was used to identify where future 
stakeholder negotiation opportunities are most likely to prove diplomatically beneficial. 
This research will also reveal the appropriate level of investment required from a military 
perspective to best meet United States security concerns in the Arctic.  
 
References 
Department of Homeland Security. “Polar Icebreaker Mission Need Statement, Version 
1.0.” June 28, 2013. 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), 
http://worldmaritimenews.com/archives/161360/study-northern-sea-route-to-
overpower-suez-canal/   
The University of Maine. Climate Change Institute. Orono, ME: University of Maine, 
2016. 
The White House. United States National Strategy for the Arctic Region. May 2013. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf. 
  
                                                 
4 Department of Homeland Security, “Polar Icebreaker Mission Need Statement, Version 1.0,” June 
28, 2013, 9. 
 xviii 




Only when the ice breaks will you truly know who is your friend and who 
is your enemy. 
—Inuit Proverb1 
A. THE STRATEGIC PROBLEM 
Russia shows great interest in the Arctic High North, both economically and 
militarily, but the region has yet to emerge as a true priority for the United States. Still, 
exploration activities there have drastically increased, and there is a newfound interest in 
this resource-rich area. The drastic reduction of Arctic sea ice over the past decade has 
focused policy attention toward the region in an attempt to best utilize an ice-free Arctic 
within decades (see Figure 1). The changes to the Arctic brought about by warming 
temperatures will allow an increase in exploration for oil, gas and essential minerals not 
only for the five Arctic coastal states—the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway and 
Denmark (Greenland)—but for countries such as China as well.2 
                                                 
1 Sean A. Stein, The Submarine--The Key to Winning an Arctic Conflict, Naval War College Newport 
Ri Joint Military Operations Dept., 2013, 1. 
2 Ibid. 
 2 
Figure 1.  At the Top of the World3 
 
This image shows the diminishment of Arctic sea ice and the increased use of the 
Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route. As the ice continues to melt, ease of 
access to oil and gas exploration coupled with the commercial shipping and tourism 
industry will bring forth a new set of strategic and geopolitical challenges. This is the 
fundamental basis for why we believe this region to be an area ripe for a potential “New 
Colder War.” 
Although there appears to be significant international cooperation on Arctic 
issues, despite Russia’s potential to dominate in the region, it is increasingly being 
viewed by concerned countries as an emerging security issue and ultimately could 
become a security threat. This security issue stems from its geographic and economic 
importance combined with the military capability that could be leveraged within the High 
North, including but not limited to permanent basing options, power projection, large-
                                                 
3 Source: Graphic by Stephen Rountree; see Thomas Omstead, “Global Warming Triggers an 




force exercises and the extension of global reach. With the release of the Russian 
National Strategy in December 2015, it became evident that Russia will continue to 
aggressively pursue access and resources in the Arctic that will afford it full freedom of 
maneuverability and uncontested operations. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
While there are clear Russian-stated policies and ongoing associated actions to 
enact those policies in the High North, the United States currently lacks similar 
comprehensive Arctic policies and, where such policy exists, there is a gap in the 
resources needed to execute it. Based on the time it would take to organize, train and 
equip resources using the whole-of-government approach and to secure U.S.-stated policy 
objectives in the Arctic, the United States is at a pivotal point in deciding if an Arctic 
investment is truly worthwhile. As the diplomatic, military and economic resources 
required to execute foreign policy on a global scale are limited, the United States must 
choose where to place its emphasis. This presents the following root question: How 
should the United States implement and prioritize instruments of power in order to 
achieve its most desirable outcome in the region? More simply stated: Should the United 
States invest in or divest from its Arctic policy and efforts?  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
While the Arctic region remains an area of high strategic investment and priority 
for Russia both economically and militarily, it has yet to fully emerge as a strategic 
priority for the United States, except in outdated policies.4 As warmer temperatures cause 
an abrupt melting of sea ice in the Arctic and exploration activities drastically increase, 
there is a new interest in this resource-rich area.5 Despite some level of discussion within 
                                                 
4 The White House, “National Strategy for the Arctic Region,” 2009 and November 2013; National 
Security Strategy. Washington, DC: White House, February 2015, February 2015; Ronald O’Rourke, 
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, October 14, 
2016; The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A Historical Perspective), United Nations 
Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone, 2008; Navy Task Force 
Climate Change, U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014–2030, February 2014. 
5 Hobart King, “Oil and Natural Gas Resources of the Arctic,” Geology.com, accessed November 29, 
2016, geology.com/articles/arctic-oil-and-gas. 
 4 
the Arctic Council, the U.S. and NATO, none of these critical stakeholders have yet to 
fully resource and execute the strategy outlined in the established policy documents (see 
Figure 2).6 Nonetheless, record low amounts of Arctic sea ice over the past decade have 
shifted global attention to the region and have opened a new dialogue in determining the 
best way forward utilizing an emerging Arctic (see Figure 2).7 
Figure 2.  Literature Overview  
 
  
                                                 
6 Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, January 2014. 
7 King, “Oil and Natural Gas Resources of the Arctic.” 
 5 
The five Arctic coastal states—the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway and 
Denmark (Greenland)—are preparing Arctic territorial claims. The abrupt changes 
surrounding the Arctic will allow increased opportunities for exploration and use of a 
wide range of resources.8 Additionally, a year-round ice-free Arctic shipping route will 
almost certainly cause a paradigm shift in global trading patterns, namely between 
Europe and China.9 The second- and third-order effects of such a shift are significant to 
the global balance and distribution of power from both an economic and a security 
standpoint.10  
In his book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Paul Kennedy discusses how 
presence is everything; the fact that Russia has significant advantages in military 
capability, territory, population and survivability highlights the fact that it holds the 
greatest leverage against other High North stakeholders.11 Respected author Robert D. 
Kaplan asserts in his 2012 book, The Revenge of Geography, that the natural conditions 
of the Arctic have a major impact on its potential for human endeavor, as he studies the 
positive development potential in parallel with the total lack of development of 
civilizations and populations in Arctic climates. Kaplan goes on to echo the 2010 works 
of Stephen Larrabee, who long before the Russian takeover of Crimea made the case that 
geopolitics had re-emerged in Russia, Ukraine and Eastern Europe.12 There are very few 
sources arguing against the growing significance of the Arctic, as globalization and 
melting ice continue to elevate the importance of the region.  
The primary division of Arctic expert schools of thought is between alarmists who 
believe that melting ice will soon reinvigorate a Cold War–era Arctic, with nuclear 
                                                 
8 National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC). “Arctic Sea Ice News and Analysis.”  October 15, 
2016. http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/. 
9 Jessie Carman, “Economic and Strategic Implications of Ice-Free Arctic Seas,” in Globalization and 
Maritime Power, Sam J. Tangredi (ed) (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2002), 171. 
10 Ibid., 13. 
11 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict 
from 1500–2000 (Fontana Press, 1989), 86. 
12 Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and 
the Battle Against Fate (Random House, 2012), 45–96; Stephen F. Larrabee, “Russia, Ukraine and Central 
Europe: The Return of Geopolitics,” Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 2 (2010). 
 6 
submarines, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms coupled with long-
range strategic bombers transiting back and forth between the United States and Russia—
along with an increased role for China13—and those who view the likely or optimal 
future of the Arctic as peaceful development that is mutually beneficial to all the Arctic 
states and the greater world order.14 
The dovish view is best summarized by Andrew Hart in a 2012 Brookings 
Institution study in which the researchers argue not only that Arctic development will 
benefit all stakeholders but also that the increased cooperation and resource incentives in 
the region will serve to balance global power and as such reduce tensions between the 
United States and other rising powers, namely China and Russia.15 While some may find 
it threatening for Russia to dominate the Arctic, it may be a venue for Russia to serve as a 
global leader without any increased threat to the United States.16 The harsh and 
threatening rhetoric from the Russian government on seizing dominance of the Arctic 
may be nothing more than Russia’s attempt to dominate domestic consumption of 
resources; in reality, the “Russian government has continually pursued practical 
cooperative steps with other Arctic states.”17 These efforts have included attempts to 
increase economic cooperation while simultaneously solving territorial disputes within 
the region, without any NATO or Arctic Council involvement.18 Although Russia views 
the Arctic as a forum in which to assert its status as a major international power, its 
primary interest is undoubtedly economic development, which will cost significantly less 
if done peacefully.19  
                                                 
14 Nele Matz-Luck, “Planting a Flag in Arctic Waters: Russia’s Claim to the North Pole,” Goettingen 
Journal of International Law 1 (2009): 235–255. 
14 Bruce Jones, Andrew Hart, and David Steven, “Chill Out: Why Cooperation Is Balancing Conflict 
among Major Powers in the New Arctic,” Brookings Institution, May 30, 2012. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 





In his 2011 book Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change, James Kraska 
makes the case that the simple etymology of how key Arctic states refer to the emerging 
and complex situation may drive how they think about the Arctic and what actions they 
take. When talking about Arctic security, the immediate implications are of appropriate 
military means to “secure” the interests of the competing states, whereas a simple change 
to Arctic stewardship implies a much more peaceful and cooperative environment, where 
military buildup and the corresponding escalating tension are not necessities.20 
The hawkish argument is that despite significant international cooperation on 
Arctic issues, concerned countries should increasingly view the potential for competing 
interests and associated resources in the High North as an emerging security issue and 
ultimately a potential security threat.21 This stems from the region’s geographic and 
economic importance combined with the potential military capability states could bring 
to bear in the High North, which includes permanent basing options, power projection, 
large-force exercises and the extension of global reach.22 With the December 31, 2015, 
release of the Russian National Strategy,23 and consistent with the EUCOM theater 
strategy,24 it became evident that Russia intends to aggressively pursue regional access 
and resource exploration in the Arctic that could ultimately afford it full and uncontested 
freedom of maneuver. With 30 percent of the world’s remaining energy resources quickly 
becoming accessible under melting sea ice, the potential Russian dominance of the Arctic 
could be viewed as a strategic threat to energy security; Russian control of the remaining 
energy resources may prove a viable threat to U.S. national security.25 
                                                 
20 James Kraska, ed., Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 
2011). 
21 Carman, “Economic and Strategic Implications,” 178. 
22 Ibid. 
23 “Russian National Security Strategy,” IEEE, December 31, 2015, 
http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-
Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf. 
24 Phillip M. Breedlove, United States European Command Theater Strategy, October 2015, accessed 
March 20, 2016, www.eucom.mil/media-library/document/35147/useucom-theater-strategy. 




This thesis uses the Senturion predictive political simulation modeling to develop 
likely implications and outcomes of various U.S. Arctic policies that might play out over 
the next 20 years. The policy options assessed include the following: 
1. A full U.S. militarization of the Arctic 
2. A measurable/modest investment of military assets solely used as an 
Arctic deterrent 
3. A full and complete demilitarization of the Arctic 
Senturion fuses advances in computational analytics with subject-matter expert 
inputs to anticipate political outcomes, providing intelligence analyses in advance. It 
anticipates the stakeholder interactions that determine political outcomes. Using this 
baseline, Senturion can identify successful courses of action to shape those outcomes, 
simulate multiple hypothetical scenarios of interest and identify early warning events and 
triggers for significant change and follow-on actions.26 Senturion simulates stakeholders’ 
round-by-round political interactions, animating a graphical representation into a “movie” 
to show the dynamics of how political interests, decisions and outcomes will likely 
evolve. Using this baseline to reflect current conditions, analysts can explore implications 
of different strategies, courses of action and/or policy approaches. Additionally, 
Senturion can help assess whether and how political outcomes can be shaped in advance 
for hypothetical scenarios. The baseline assessment, policy shaping and hypothetical 
scenarios directly address changes concerning the specific issue of interest.27 
Senturion is well designed to address our research question. The software can 
model the three hypothetical policy avenues proposed and incorporate the negotiating 
positions of Arctic stakeholders, namely the U.S. and Russia. The level of stakeholder 
input can be adjusted based on the varying amounts of leverage and influence garnered 
through military investment and current and projected posture in the Arctic. By 
                                                 
26 “Senturion,” Acertas Strategy and Analytics, accessed May 28, 2016, http://www.acertas-
analytics.com/senturion/. 
27 “Senturion,” Acertas Strategy and Analytics, accessed May 28, 2016, http://www.acertas-
analytics.com/senturion/. 
 9 
compiling data through research and input from Arctic experts, the research team will 
populate the model with the best possible data to accurately simulate the balance of 
power and influence in the Arctic over the next 30 years.  
Upon arriving at the results of each of three hypothetical U.S. policies for military 
investment in the Arctic, the research team will carefully formulate initial findings and 
likely recommendations. From this information, the team will be able to provide a 
tangible example of the likely power distribution dynamics of the future Arctic based on 
the three military policy decisions. 
At the completion of research and modeling through Senturion wargaming, the 
research team will provide a recommendation on the optimal U.S. Arctic policy and 
posture for military investment and the potential risk and reward of various levels of U.S. 
military investment in the Arctic. 
  
 10 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 11 
II. HIGH NORTH KEY FACTORS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
A. CLIMATE ADAPTATION AND REMEDIATION 
Borders? I have never seen one, but I heard they exist in the minds of most 
people. 
—Thor Heyerdahl28 
One does not have to look very deeply into the past two decades of Arctic 
meteorological data to conclude the High North has undergone some of the most abrupt, 
nonlinear environmental changes experienced on the planet. Take Greenland as an 
example—the average annual air temperature has risen over three degrees Celsius 
relative to the period between 1979 and 2000. Simultaneously, the amount of recorded 
sea ice in the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans is now at its lowest level in 10 years.29 
Figure 3 shows the annual warming temperatures over the past 70 years. In addition, 
Figure 4 depicts a historical comparison between 1984 perennial sea ice (e.g., the portion 
of ice that survives the summer melt season) and 2016 data.30  
                                                 
28 Thor Heyerdahl (1914–2002), distinguished research associate of the Climate Change Institute. The 
University of Maine. Climate Change Institute Pamphlet. Orono, ME: University of Maine, 2016. 
29 Dr. Paul Andrew Mayewski, Director, Climate Change Institute, briefing given to the research 
team, July 15, 2016. 
30 Brandon Miller, “Amid Higher Global Temperatures, Sea Ice at Record Lows at Poles,” CNN, last 




Figure 3.  Climate Reanalyzer Graph of N. Hemisphere Annual 
Temperatures31 
 
Figure 4.  CNN Video Comparison of Arctic Perennial Sea Ice Change 
between 1984 and 201632 
 
 
                                                 
31 Dr. Paul Andrew Mayewski, Director, Climate Change Institute, briefing given to the research team, 
July 15, 2016. 
32 Adapted from Miller, “Amid Higher Global Temperatures.” 
…By March 2016, only 211,000 square km remained 
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As the temperatures in the High North rise and Arctic sea ice continues to recede, 
it further highlights not only Arctic accessibility as a security concern but also how the 
climate exacerbates the associated security implications. In 2013, the chairman of the 
Artic Council, Secretary of State John Kerry, noted the significant overlap of the interests 
of the eight member states and how their decisions “don’t stop at the 66th parallel.” He 
also mentioned that climate change is the most far-reaching issue in the area, affecting all 
things, including “our economies, national security and international stability (refer back 
to Figure 1).”33 
As the climate continues to adapt and temperatures steadily rise on a global scale 
based on human actions and interactions, oil, gas and minerals will become easier to 
obtain. This will bring its own unique set of challenges, including increased pollution in 
the region and the potential for more mishaps.  
B. SEARCH AND RESCUE 
Imagine a near ice-free High North scenario with a sharp increase in commercial 
traffic using the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage. As more and more vessels 
begin to transit the region, the chance of an oil tanker spilling black oil across a backdrop 
of white greatly increases. While some have considered this scenario, its implications and 
the actions it would call for have not been fully analyzed or put into practice. Though the 
U.S. and Canada have rehearsed associated response options in Arctic waters, the U.S. 
and Russia have not tested their coordinated responses since the Arctic SAR Agreement 
was signed in 1989.34 
While the environmental impacts of a catastrophic oil spill event are undoubtedly 
high, the ability of the United States to successfully execute search and rescue operations 
in the region are even more consequential. United States Coast Guard aircraft could take 
                                                 
33 U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, remarks given at the Arctic Council Ministerial Session, Kiruna, 
Sweden, May 15, 2013, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/05/209403.htm. 
34 Text of final version of agreement made ready for signing and dated April 21, 2011, 
http://arcticcouncil.org/filearchive/Arctic_SAR_Agreement_EN_FINAL_for_signature_21-Apr-2011.pdf. 
For a State Department fact sheet on the agreement, see “Secretary Clinton Signs the Arctic Search and 
Rescue Agreement with Other Arctic Nations,” May 12, 2011, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/163285.htm. 
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several hours to respond to a crisis, and attempts by associated Coast Guard cutters to 
respond to a vessel in distress may take days or even weeks.35 While the Arctic Council 
came to an agreement on search and rescue borders, that agreement does not take into 
account the increased frequency of use of the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage 
that is expected in the near future (see boundary delineations, Figure 5). An example 
proving the increased accessibility is the luxury cruise ship Crystal Serenity, which, in a 
32-day voyage with over 1,600 crew and passengers onboard, became the first cruise ship 
to navigate the Northwest Passage in September of 2016. Additionally, the current search 
and rescue agreement as written puts the costs of executing the agreement on the 
requesting country and also states that the “implementation of the agreement shall be 
subject to the availability of relevant resources.”36 
Figure 5.  Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement Areas of Application 
Boundaries Map37 
 
                                                 
35 Coastal Response and Research Center, Opening the Arctic Seas: Envisioning Disasters and 
Framing Solutions (Durham: University of New Hampshire, 2009). 
36 U.S. Department of State, “Maritime Matters: Search and Rescue in the Arctic; Agreement between 
the United States of America and Other Governments, Annex 12,” Nuuk, May 12, 2011. 
37 Source: “Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement,” accessed July 7, 2011, 
http://www.arcticportal.org/features/feautres-of-2011/arctic-search-and-rescue-agreement. 
 15 
C. POTENTIAL FOR COVERT OR CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS 
With the December 31, 2015, release of the Russian National Strategy,38 and 
consistent with the EUCOM theater strategy,39 it is now evident that Russia intends to 
aggressively pursue regional access and resource exploration in the Arctic that will 
ultimately afford it full freedom of maneuverability and the potential for uncontested 
operations in the High North. This presents the following questions: What is the strategic 
value of the Arctic? Is it truly significant enough to invest military and diplomatic capital 
into making the United States capable of operating on par with Russia in the Arctic, or is 
the potential vulnerability in not doing so overstated? Should the U.S. allow other world 
powers to take the lead in the Arctic and could this ultimately serve the best interest of all 
stakeholders, or is now the time to introduce covert action options as a distinct capability 
within the region?  
While peaceful development is likely the preferred course of action for many 
Arctic stakeholders, the potential to act militarily in the region may be increasingly 
important to maintaining the peace and proving that the U.S. and NATO do in fact have a 
credible deterrent option in the High North. While the current U.S. military is neither 
trained nor equipped to conduct sustained operations in the Arctic, a small covert team 
may be able to influence the region.  
As T. E. Lawrence once stated, “The smaller the unit, the better its 
performance.”40 This could hold completely true in the Arctic’s harsh environment. 
Ultimately, strategic utility may be achieved through covert action operations using 
nongovernmental organizations currently in place in the region. In the Arctic specifically, 
there would be a heavy dependence on many indigenous personnel and internal 
organizations, and it would be extremely difficult to conduct operations without 
leveraging those organizations. 
                                                 
38 IEEE, “Russian National Security Strategy,” December 31, 2015, http://www.ieee.es/ 
Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strategy-
31Dec2015.pdf. 
39 Breedlove, United States European Command Theater Strategy. 
40 T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (New York: Knopf Doubleday, 1991), 136. 
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In order to explore the best utility for covert action as an option in the High North, 
it is important to start with the foundational definition of covert action as given in 50 U.S. 
Code § 3093: 
“Covert action” is an activity or activities of the United States 
Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions 
abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government 
will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include: (1) 
activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, 
traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve 
or maintain the operational security of United States Government 
programs, or administrative activities; (2) traditional diplomatic or 
military activities or routine support to such activities; (3) traditional law 
enforcement activities conducted by United States Government law 
enforcement agencies or routine support to such activities; or (4) activities 
to provide routine support to the overt activities (other than activities 
described in (1), (2), or (3)) of other United States Government agencies 
abroad.41 
 
Looking at this definition and pairing it with Mark Lowenthal’s covert action 
ladder,42 there are three areas where covert action could have the highest strategic utility. 
In this modified three-step covert action ladder for the Arctic, the primary vehicles of 
influence would be propaganda, economic activity and paramilitary operations. These 
three do not discount the others; however, they stand out as the immediate tools that 
could be invoked, reducing the steps from five to three (see Figure 6).  
                                                 
41 Title 50 U.S. Code § 3093, 1947, Section E. 
42 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 2nd Ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003). 
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Figure 6.  Modified Covert Action Ladder for the Arctic High North43 
 
Although the Arctic region does not have an abundance of human inhabitants, 
covert propaganda could still be a viable tool to cast Russian expansionism into the 
Arctic in a negative light, highlighting it as threatening to a host of countries and posing a 
detriment to the global environment. Anti-Russian-expansionist propaganda could be 
covertly distributed by the admittedly small populous of approximately 2,000 people on 
the island of Svalbard, which is Norwegian property although one third of its inhabitants 
are Russian citizens. Svalbard could be a key island of influence from a propaganda 
standpoint that would help shape the conditions should further escalation be warranted. 
Secondly, with the vast untapped resources in the Arctic region, there is an 
opportunity to exploit Russian exploration activities from an economic standpoint by 
coupling those activities with the aforementioned propaganda efforts. Covert actions in 
the High North could be designed to force an overinvestment of Russian resources, 
causing a slow depletion that would hinder Russian actions over the long term. 
Additionally, covert actions executed elsewhere across the globe could potentially force 
                                                 
43 Adapted from Lowenthal. Intelligence  Modified to place greater emphasis on the three elements of 
paramilitary operations, economic activity and propaganda as geared primarily toward the Arctic and 
potentially to serve as the primary means of covert action operations as opposed to the five outlined by 
Lowenthal. 
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Russia into an economic reprioritization, leaving the Arctic available to others who 
would be afforded an equal share.  
Lastly, covert action using paramilitary operations could be a means to disable 
critical infrastructure. This could in fact be the highest area of strategic payoff in the 
region. Such operations could function much like actions executed under the codename 
“Olympic Games,” in which many high-level national organizations in the United States 
allegedly worked together to develop a first-use cyber-attack capability intended to 
impose long-term damage on the Natanz nuclear production facility and other Iranian 
nuclear enrichment facilities. Only the top officials in the United States intelligence 
community, military services and the White House knew the details behind the creation 
and implementation of the Stuxnet cyber-attack weapon.44 A similar type of capability 
could be used to impact Russian oil production facilities, causing a slow drain on Russian 
finances by forcing a reinvestment to fix components that are failing much more quickly 
than expected at any given oil refinery. Additionally, paramilitary operations could begin 
causing “unknown fires or explosions” at Arctic-based Russian facilities or bases to 
discredit Russian capabilities in the Arctic region. 
Through the lens of an operational prioritized approach, the target location in this 
case proves the most critical element. The Arctic, by and large, truly is uncharted 
territory. This means there is a lack of intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance in the 
region, and U.S./NATO personnel as a whole do not organize or train to engage in 
operational Arctic conditions, nor are they suitably equipped. While there is no known 
covert action history in the area, elements of previous actions could be adopted (i.e., 
broadcasts, publications, etc.), although the target audience is minimal. The priority area 
to assess in order to reap the greatest strategic utility lies in the realm of economics. If 
covert propaganda is devised to promote the narrative that Russia is viewed across the 
international stage as a “poor steward” of the region with the sole intention of advancing 
its own economic and military capabilities in order to encroach upon other states, the 
covert action would be deemed successful. If warranted, covert action in the Artic similar 
                                                 
44 David E. Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American 
Power (New York: Crown, 2012), 188.  
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to Stuxnet could be an efficient, cost-effective and low-risk method of countering 
Russian military policy and economic advancement in the region. 
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III. SENTURION PREDICTIVE POLITICAL SIMULATION 
MODEL 
A. SENTURION OVERVIEW 
Senturion is a predictive analysis software tool that supports and guides decision 
makers in collecting and organizing data, anticipating others’ next moves and planning 
appropriate responses. Senturion forecasts stakeholder behavior using simulation 
software. It empowers analysts and decision makers to anticipate complex human 
behaviors and simulate, with a high degree of reliability, the behavior of closed regimes 
and cross-national networks. These simulations can be used to examine the performance 
of the subject stakeholders in various scenarios, create additional understanding of the 
processes at work, forecast decision outcomes and predict behavior of group members 
under varying conditions.45 
The U.S. State Department finds “of the various models tested by the Bureau, 
Senturion performed with the highest level of accuracy and granularity at over 90% for 
baseline projections,” and “declassified evaluations by the U.S. intelligence 
community find analyst and expert predictions are right less than 50% of the time in 
complex scenarios, but ACERTAS’ [Senturion creator] approach is accurate above 85% 
of the time.”46 As early as 2002, the U.S. Department of Defense was testing applications 
of the software on complex problems in the defense sector, and in 2006, researchers at 
the National Defense University tested the accuracy of the program by analyzing three 
cases in which it was employed during unfolding events: the stabilization and 
reconstruction phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the run-up to the Iraqi elections 
in January 2005 and the leadership transition in Palestine following the death of Yasser 
Arafat.47 The researchers concluded that “each project tracked well with reality, often 
                                                 
45 Senturion Forecasting LLC, Senturion Analyst Guide Government, Version 5.2 (New York: 
Senturion Forecasting LLC), 5. 
46 “Senturion,” Acertas Strategy and Analytics, http://www.acertas-analytics.com/senturion/, accessed 
May 18, 2016. 
47 Mark Abdollahian et al., “Senturion: A Predictive Political Simulation Model,” Defense and 
Technology Paper, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 
2006, 1. 
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providing counterintuitive results,” and that Senturion was indeed a viable tool for 
predicting complex political outcomes.48  
Senturion’s technological foundation incorporates leading-edge economic models 
derived from game theory, decision theory, spatial bargaining models and risk 
management. Each of these approaches addresses specific aspects of the predictive 
analytical process.49 Senturion has integrated the most powerful aspects of each of these 
models into an agent-based analytical methodology. 
A “snapshot” of the political landscape in the form of relative importance and 
influence scores by stakeholders is all the data that is required to begin predictive analysis 
modeling with Senturion. As stated in the Senturion program manual, “Building on the 
requisite data, Senturion combines elements of the key microeconomic theories into a 
single set of algorithms that predict the evolution of the political landscape over time 
through accurate and systematic analysis.”50  
With a basic understanding of Senturion’s capabilities and limitations, we 
hypothesized that it had great potential to aid our research effort by providing predictive 
analysis of the evolving political landscape of the emerging High North and what it may 
look like in the distant future based on the current snapshot of stakeholders. Therefore, 
the next research step was to gather and interpret available data to determine the most 
accurate snapshot of the current High North situation.  
B. DETERMINING INITIAL DATA SET 
The purpose of this section is to explain the process that was used to translate 
mostly qualitative underlying data into numbers on a zero to 100 scale for input into the 
Senturion software. An inherent limitation of the software is that all factors must be 
distilled into relative numbers on a scale; each stakeholder has a numerical score for the 
relative importance of the issue to them and a numerical score for the relative influence 
the stakeholder has on the issue compared to the other stakeholders. As a check to this 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 19.  
49 Senturion Forecasting LLC, Senturion Analyst Guide Government Version 5.2, 6. 
50 Ibid., 7. 
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potential vulnerability, Senturion incorporates robustness testing, which is a method to 
determine how much variability in the initial input data influences the outcome of the 
model, if at all. In order to model the issue of Arctic control and influence as accurately 
as possible, we researched what available data could logically support the model. The 
first area to be determined was importance. 
1. Importance  
Senturion describes importance as the ranking of this particular issue relative to 
everything else the stakeholder addresses.51 In attempting to decipher what importance 
the Arctic holds on a relative scale for each stakeholder to be modeled, we first 
researched each stakeholder’s overarching national security strategy document and 
recorded how many times and to what extent it makes mention of the Arctic, and then 
whether the stakeholder nation has a specific, separate Arctic policy document. Without 
knowing the inner thoughts of the leadership of these nations, the publicly published 
policies on the Arctic are the most reliable indicators of intent available for the model.  
The next data point used was the percent of gross domestic product derived from 
the Artic by each stakeholder nation. Due to the fact that most national interest in the 
Arctic stems from potential or realized economic benefits, this element is vital to 
determining what importance the Arctic truly plays for each state. Once the data was 
compiled, the stakeholders were ranked according to importance, and then using this data 
and the input of several subject-matter experts, a relative score for each stakeholder was 
created on the zero to 100 scale.  
2. Influence  
Senturion describes influence as relative ranking of potential to affect the issue 
outcome.52 Influence is best thought of as the total weight or value the stakeholder would 
have if all their time, energy and resources were devoted to the issue at hand.53 Using a 
                                                 
51 Ibid., 11. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., 23. 
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similar process to how importance was determined, and because our research question 
was primarily focused on the military aspect of the future High North, we decided to look 
at the military and physical realms to determine the relative influence of the Arctic 
stakeholders. We considered some economic measures such as Arctic gross regional 
production, but we determined that military assets and capabilities and physical territory 
were the best measures of potential to influence the Arctic.  
The Arctic environment is naturally difficult to access. Therefore, the mere 
capability to gain physical access to the area and sustain any type of element there has a 
much greater effect on ability to influence the region than it does for any other region of 
the Earth. Almost all physical Arctic access is facilitated by the military assets of each 
stakeholder nation. The measure of physical territory of each nation within the Arctic was 
also deemed significant, due to the possibility of basing and sustaining military and 
commercial ventures, the ability to shorten or maintain lines of communication in a 
military conflict and perceptions of legitimacy in the international community and among 
indigenous Arctic populations. 
We researched the Arctic military assets and capabilities of each stakeholder 
nation and categorized them by air, land and sea (see the Appendix). Additional weight 
was given to influence scores for assets specifically designed for operation in the Arctic 
versus those which are merely able to “survive” for short periods of time in Arctic 
conditions and with elevated risk. Icebreaking ships were also deemed critical to the 
influence score of each stakeholder, due to their ability to create Arctic access for any 
venture, military, commercial, scientific or otherwise. Even in a significantly warmer 
Arctic climate, persistent sea ice and low temperatures will continue to be a threat to 
surface ships, and the requirements to sustain surface ships in this climate will be 
significant and challenging. A surface naval vessel following an icebreaking ship is 
canalized to a very narrow path and unable to maneuver as designed. “Personnel require 
additional protective equipment, while ships and aircraft require additional heating 
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elements to keep their temperature at a suitable level for operations and to prevent sea 
spray from freezing on the ship and causing substantial ice build-up.”54 
Another important factor to consider when determining influence values and 
associated Senturion influence scores is submarines and undersea warfare. In an 
escalation to a military conflict, the submarine could be the primary tool of dominance in 
the Arctic region. Shy of an all-out hot war, however, the effects of the submarine are 
negligible, and each stakeholder’s capabilities are relatively balanced. Of the four Arctic 
States which operate submarines, only Russia and the United States have significant 
enough fleets and capabilities to tangibly influence the balance of military power in the 
Arctic. Other than Russia using a submarine to plant a flag on the floor of the North Pole 
in 2007 to signify “the Arctic is ours,” there has not been much real-world submarine 
usage aside from transient passages.55 In terms of a prewar, irregular or hybrid conflict 
without openly declared hostilities, the submarine’s ability to support humanitarian 
operations, oil spill eradication, environmental catastrophes, search and rescue and 
tourism is negligible. In this context, surface vessels and air and land units warrant a 
higher influence weight due to their leveraging potential across the more likely scenarios. 
Nuclear-powered fast attack submarines will always be welcomed under the ice and 
Arctic Sea to ensure a capable force is ready to ensure maritime control; however, for the 
likely Arctic scenarios short of conventional war, the submarine is weighted in the 
influence scores for its deterrent effect—U.S. and Russian submarines deter one another 
from initiating a conventional war in the Arctic and potentially have a stabilizing effect 
across the region.56 
After compiling the assets and capabilities of each Arctic stakeholder and 
factoring in the percentage of Arctic territory owned by each, we compared and 
contrasted the stakeholders to determine the relative influence scores from zero to 100 for 
input into the Senturion software.  
                                                 
54 Stein, The Submarine, 10. 
55 Mark Galeotti, “Cold Calling – Competition Heats Up for Arctic Resources” Jane’s Intelligence 
Review, 18 September 2008 
56 Jan Joel Andersson, “The Race to the Bottom: Submarine Proliferation and International Security,” 
Naval War College Review 68, no. 1 (2015): 12. 
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C. STAKEHOLDER BACKGROUND 
As listed earlier, there are eight nations that own physical territory within the 
Arctic Circle: the United States, Russia, Canada, Norway, Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, 
Finland and Sweden. This section will briefly describe each group’s Arctic positioning 
with respect to policy and economy and military capability, along with corresponding 
relative importance and influence scores derived for building the “base case” Senturion 
model for the issues of the High North. 
1. United States 
The 2015 United States National Security Strategy makes three off-handed 
references to the Arctic and contains no specific policy statement concerning the 
region.57 The U.S. does have a specific Arctic policy document titled “National Strategy 
for the Arctic Region,” published in May of 2013, which is a direct regurgitation of 
President Bush’s 2009 Arctic policy with a new signature from President Obama.58 The 
three published objectives of the United States in the Arctic are to: “(1) facilitate safe, 
secure and reliable navigation, which depends on reliable infrastructure to support 
shipping activities in cooperation with other nations; (2) protect maritime commerce; and 
(3) protect the Arctic environment through a risk-based capability to address 
environmental hazards.”59 Although it owns 10 percent of Arctic territory and produces 
13 percent of Arctic gross regional product, the United States currently derives less than 
one percent of its gross domestic product from the region.60  
Militarily, the United States has significant air assets and capabilities as well as 
basing in the Arctic compared to other stakeholders; however, it lacks ground and sea 
capability.61 The United States does not have any specialized or dedicated Arctic ground 
units, only a handful of light infantry brigades with limited cold-weather and/or 
                                                 
57 White House, National Security Strategy. 
58 White House, “National Strategy for the Arctic Region.” 
59 Ibid.  
60 See Appendix. 
61 See Appendix. 
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mountaineering training, and while all U.S. Navy vessels are “Arctic capable” on a 
limited basis, none are specifically designed to operate continuously in the Arctic. The 
United States owns two heavy icebreaking ships, both of which are at the end of their 
lifespans and only one of which is routinely operational.62 A military strength for the 
United States is its submarine capabilities. While the number and type of U.S. submarines 
operating in the Arctic is not readily available information due to operational security and 
classification, the general composition of the United States submarine fleet is the largest 
and most capable in the world. Since 1958, in the Arctic, the U.S. Navy’s submarine has 
continued to deliver “a set of tools and capabilities to United States national security that 
are unique and indispensable, enabled by stealth, surprise and boldness while 
simultaneously providing military impact and deterrent influence far out of proportion to 
their size and quantity.”63 The U.S. operates 14 SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic missile 
submarines, four SSGN nuclear-powered guided missile submarines, and 53 SSN 
nuclear-powered general-purpose submarines.64 The SSBNs serve primarily as the third 
leg of the United States “nuclear triad” and serve no role in a potential regional Arctic 
conflict. The SSGNs could have a significant impact in an irregular Arctic conflict, 
because they are capable of carrying up to 70 Tomahawk cruise missiles or four Navy 
SEAL platoons with undersea vehicles for infiltrating or recovering small special 
operations forces.65 The United States SSNs are primarily employed in antiship and 
antisubmarine “fast attack” roles and would be critical in a conventional military conflict 
in the Arctic. Submarines being accounted for, the lack of ground and surface naval 
capabilities is still a significant shortcoming compared to Russian and Canadian Arctic 
capabilities in these domains.  
                                                 
62 Mihaela David, “Strong Foothold or on Thin Ice? U.S. Strategies for Development, Environmental 
Stewardship, and Security in the Arctic,” in Governing the North American Arctic, eds. Dawn Alexandrea 
Berry, Nigel Bowles, and Halbert Jones (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016), 122–142. 
63 Commander Submarine Forces, Undersea Warfighting, July 2011, 
http://www.public.navy.mil/subfor/hq/PDF/Undersea%20Warfighting.pdf, 2. 
64 See Appendix.  
65 Jan Joel Andersson, “The Race to the Bottom: Submarine Proliferation and International Security.” 
Naval War College Review 68, no. 1 (2015): 17–18. 
 28 
Analyzing this data in comparison to the other Arctic stakeholders, the United 
States was assigned a relative importance value of 25 and an influence value of 40 for the 
purpose of Senturion modeling.  
2. Russia 
The 2015 Russian National Security Strategy contains three specific bullets 
highlighting initiatives for the Arctic.66 The 2009 “Russian Federation Policy for the 
Arctic to 2020” serves as the Russian Arctic policy document, and it contains four 
specific policy objectives: “(a) use of the Arctic zone belonging to the Russian Federation 
as a strategic resource base providing the solution to problems of social and economic 
development in the country; (b) maintenance of the Arctic as a zone of peace and 
cooperation; (c) preservation of the Arctic’s unique ecological systems; and (d) use of the 
Northern Sea Route as a national single transport communication of the Russian 
Federation in the Arctic.”67 Russia owns 53 percent of the Arctic region, produces 70 
percent of the Arctic gross regional product and derives 16 percent of its gross domestic 
product from the Arctic.68 
Russia has positioned itself as the dominant military force in the Arctic region.69 
In the air, it has over 100 Tu-22 long-range bomber aircraft capable of reaching anywhere 
in the Arctic, 100 II-38 maritime recon aircraft and numerous other advanced radar and 
missile capabilities. For ground and maritime operations, Russia has both navy and army 
specialized Arctic brigades, as well as two Arctic special forces brigades based on the 
Kola Peninsula. The Russian Northern Fleet is stationed at several large naval and air 
bases on the Kola Peninsula and is composed of a myriad of Arctic “hardened” surface 
ships. The Russian Navy operates six heavy icebreakers, which are nuclear powered and 
heavily armed. An estimated fleet of 40 various-sized icebreakers is available for contract 
by private Russian companies. The known Russian submarine fleet consists of 11 SSBN 
                                                 
66 “Russian National Security Strategy.”  
67 “Russian Federation’s Policy for the Arctic to 2020,” September 18, 2008, http://www.arctis-
search.com/Russian+Federation+Policy+for+the+Arctic+to+2020.  
68 See Appendix.  
69 See Appendix.  
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nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, eight SSGN nuclear-powered guided 
missile submarines, 17 SSN nuclear-powered general-purpose submarines, and 20 SSK 
Kilo-class diesel-electric-powered attack submarines.70 While the overall numbers of 
Russian submarines are slightly lower than the United States’ submarine fleet, the 
capabilities and roles across the SSBN, SSGN and SSN are roughly equivalent.71 The 
Russian Kilo-class submarines are used in a tactical anti-ship and anti-submarine role and 
have limited range and duration when compared to the nuclear-powered submarines.72 
Although the Arctic takes up a moderate portion of Russian political attention, 
other pressing foreign policy issues such as Ukraine and Syria seriously divide its 
attention and ultimately give Russia a relative importance score of 35. Due to its physical 
and military dominance of the Arctic, Russia is evaluated as having a relative influence 
score of 100. 
3. Canada 
Canada’s national security document “Securing an Open Society: Canada’s 
National Security Policy” does not address specific geographic areas, but Canada does 
have an Arctic policy, which states that Canada’s Arctic objectives are to “exercise 
sovereignty, promote economic and social development, protect Canadian environmental 
heritage and improve and devolve northern governance.”73 Canada possesses 23 percent 
of the Arctic territory—including the Northwest Passage, a soon-to-be-vital commercial 
shipping lane—but currently only makes two percent of its GDP from that land.74 
Canada is soundly prepared to conduct defensive military operations in its Arctic 
territory, though not on the scale of Russia.75 Canada’s most remarkable air capability is 
its integrated network of persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) 
                                                 
70 See Appendix.  
71 Jan Joel Andersson, “The Race to the Bottom: Submarine Proliferation and International 
Security.” Naval War College Review 68, no. 1 (2015): 17–18. 
72 Ibid., 18. 
73 See Appendix.  
74 See Appendix. 
75 See Appendix. 
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nodes within the region. This includes 18 antisubmarine warfare aircraft, six joint 
uninhabited surveillance and target-acquisition unmanned aerial vehicles, air and 
underwater surveillance radars, “Polar Epsilon” observation satellites and eighty F/A-18 
combat aircraft with tanker support to increase range and station time across the High 
North. On the ground, Canada trains and maintains a 500-man Arctic army battalion at its 
Arctic training base in Resolute Bay, Nunavut, and a 5,000-strong Canadian Ranger 
paramilitary force, comprising mostly indigenous populations, which serve as a major 
ISR asset across Canada’s vast northern territory. The Canadian Navy has 15 surface 
warships and four conventional submarines, none of which are ice strengthened or 
capable of operating under ice, and a fleet of five heavy icebreakers, which are only 
capable of operating during the summer months. Its four Victoria-class submarines are 
limited to monitoring underwater traffic at key choke points such as the Northwest 
Passage, and generally only one of four submarines are operational at any given time due 
to maintenance and crew training shortfalls.76  
Due to the economic potential of large-scale commercial shipping and resource 
exploitation emerging from the melting Arctic, Canada is assigned an importance score 
of 85 for modeling. Because of its military preparedness and possession of almost a 
quarter of the Arctic territory with well-established military basing and transportation, 
Canada is given a relative influence score of 60.  
4. Norway 
Norway currently derives seven percent of its GDP from the Arctic, a percentage 
that is growing steadily with the melting ice and emerging resources.77 It is for this 
reason that Norwegian prime minister Erna Solberg wrote in November, 2014, that “the 
Arctic is Norway’s most important foreign policy priority.”78 In the same document, 
Norway outlines six Arctic policy objectives: (1) that the Arctic continues to be stable, 
                                                 
76 Phil Webster, “Arctic Sovereignty, Submarine Operations and Water Space 
Management.” Canadian Naval Review 3, no. 3 (2007): 14–16. 
77 See Appendix.  
78 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Norway’s Arctic Policy,” November 2014, 3, 
https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/ud/vedlegg/nord/nordkloden_en.pdf. 
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peaceful and predictable; (2) international cooperation; (3) business development; (4) 
knowledge development; (5) infrastructure; and (6) environmental protection and 
emergency preparedness.79 
The Norwegian military posture toward the Arctic is less robust compared to the 
other stakeholders, counteracted only partially by strong Norwegian diplomatic prowess 
where the region is concerned. Almost all Norwegian military assets are aligned toward a 
defensive posture. Norway possesses six unarmed maritime patrol aircraft and 60 F-16 
combat aircraft, all of which have very limited range outside of the Norwegian Arctic and 
require modernization.80 Norwegian Army “Brigade Nord” consists of two heavy 
mechanized infantry battalions, which are “winter trained” but only equipped for 
operations on the Norwegian mainland. The Norwegian Navy is capable of limited Arctic 
patrolling with five Arctic-capable but not ice-strengthened frigates and six Ula-class 
submarines. 
Considering the focus of the Norwegian government on the High North and 
Norway’s ability to achieve diplomatic agreements and victories regarding the region, it 
is assigned a relative importance score of 100. With very limited military and transport 
capability within the larger Arctic region, we have given Norway a relative influence 
score of 25.  
5. Denmark 
Denmark is considered an Arctic nation and stakeholder because of its possession 
of Greenland. According to the primary Danish national security document, the Danish 
Defence Agreement 2013–2017, the Arctic is a major component of the Danish number-
one priority of “home defense,” and it receives 46 other mentions throughout the 
document.81 The Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020 lists Danish 
objectives within the Arctic as “a peaceful, secure and safe Arctic; with self-sustaining 
                                                 
79 Ibid., 8–20. 
80 See Appendix. 
81 Danish Defence Agreement 2013–2017, Copenhagen, November 30, 2012, 
http://www.fmn.dk/eng/allabout/Documents/TheDanishDefenceAgrement2013-2017english-version.pdf.  
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growth and development; with respect for the Arctic’s fragile climate, environment and 
nature; in close cooperation with our international partners.”82  
Denmark currently derives four percent of its GDP from the Arctic, but that figure 
is anticipated to grow dramatically as the Greenland ice sheet continues to melt, granting 
access to massive mineral resources and fertile agricultural land within Greenland.83 
Greenland gives Demark a substantial 12 percent territorial possession of the Arctic 
region.84 
Denmark is the weakest influencer of the five Arctic nations due to its distance 
from the actual Arctic region and lack of assets to operate within it. It has no air assets 
dedicated to the Arctic; its land forces are limited to a small paramilitary Slaedepatrulje 
Sirius (sled patrol) force on Greenland and a small special forces unit known as the 
Fromadskorps (“Frogman Corps”) capable of operating within Greenland. There is a 
Danish Navy base at Kangilinnguit, Greenland, and the Royal Danish Navy has five 
Arctic-capable but not ice-strengthened frigates and one ice-strengthened large patrol 
craft, which is heavily armed.85 We have assessed Denmark with a relative importance 
score of 95 due to the magnitude of Greenland and its potential and a relative influence 
score of 15 due to a lack of capability to operate in the Arctic. 
6. Iceland 
Iceland’s Arctic policy describes 12 principles, which include “securing Iceland’s 
position as a coastal state within the Arctic region; building on agreements and promoting 
cooperation with other states and stakeholders on issues relating to Icelandic interests in 
the Arctic region; safeguarding broadly defined security interests in the Arctic region 
through civilian means and working against any kind of militarization of the Arctic; and 
                                                 




83 James Astill, “The Melting North,” Economist, June 16, 2012. 
84 See Appendix. 
85 See Appendix. 
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developing further trade relations between states in the Arctic.”86 Interestingly, only a 
tiny offshore Icelandic island is geographically located within the Arctic Circle; however, 
all of Iceland’s GDP is derived from the greater High North, and the Icelandic 
government is clearly jockeying to claim its stake and relevance within the region.87  
Iceland maintains virtually no military and relies heavily on its NATO allies to 
assist it in defense. It possesses no native air or land assets other than a state police, and 
its main sea asset is the Icelandic Coast Guard, which is limited to surveilling Iceland’s 
exclusive economic zones and territorial waters. Due to its reliance on the Arctic for 
fisheries and maritime commercial production, Iceland is rated with a relative importance 
score of 100. Due to its complete lack of ability to project power, minimal self-defense, 
and minimal territory and population, its relative influence score is 10.  
7. Finland 
Finland’s 2015 “Strategic Priorities of the Foreign Service” characterizes the 
nation as “active in making effective use of the Arctic region” and states that it 
“advocates for the development of Arctic cooperation.”88 It has a robust Arctic strategy 
document published in 2013, which describes a multitude of objectives aligned with the 
vision of Finland as “an active Arctic actor with the ability to reconcile the limitations 
imposed and business opportunities provided by the Arctic environment in a sustainable 
                                                 
86 “A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Policy,” March 28, 2011, 
https://www.mfa.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policy-
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manner while relying on international cooperation.”89 Although it owns only one percent 
of the Arctic territory, Finland makes more than 12 percent of its GDP from the Arctic.90 
The Finnish Jaeger Brigade is a special operations unit which specializes in polar 
warfare and is capable of conducting a broad range of missions in the Arctic 
environment; it is supported by limited air and maritime transportation methods out of 
northern Finland.91 We have rated Finland with a relative importance score of 40 due to 
its preoccupation with Russia and other Baltic-based issues in its foreign policy dealings. 
Due to its specialized but limited capability and relatively strong bilateral and multilateral 
diplomatic relations with other Arctic nations, we have given Finland a relative influence 
score of 25. 
8. Sweden 
The most current Swedish national security document, “Swedish National 
Security: Challenges and Opportunities beyond 2014,” makes four references to the 
Arctic and notes that “the Arctic or Barents region is attracting increasing and important 
attention in global security policies.”92 Sweden has published an Arctic policy with six 
objectives focused on cooperation at various levels between stakeholders such as the 
Arctic Council and the European Union.93 Sweden owns approximately one percent of 
Arctic territory and gains seven percent of its GDP from the Arctic.94  
                                                 
89 Prime Minister’s Office, Finland, “Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013,” August 23, 
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94 See Appendix.  
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The Swedish Air Force operates Gripen fighters from its Arctic air base at Luleå. 
For its land component, the Swedish military has the Armed Forces Winter Unit, also 
known as the Norrbotten Regiment, which is an Arctic-armored light infantry and ranger 
regiment capable of conducting a diverse set of missions in the Arctic climate.95 Despite 
its Arctic basing and prowess in Arctic tactics, the Swedish military is dwarfed in size by 
Russia and is focused almost exclusively on the Russian threat to the Swedish homeland; 
it would have a difficult time projecting power in the Arctic. For the initial model, we 
have assigned Sweden a relative importance score of 30 and a relative influence score 
of 15.  
Having derived appropriate data and scores with which to populate the Senturion 
model, in the next chapter we will analyze the output of the “base case” Senturion model 
of the current dynamics of Arctic control. From that point, we will adjust the resource 
investment and corresponding relative influence level of the United States to model 
alternative outcomes, and we will explore some manual iterations of the model to attempt 
to identify opportunities and beneficial bilateral or multilateral High North partners for 
the United States.  
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IV. SENTURION MODELING RESULTS 
The first scenario modeled is the Arctic “base case,” which will establish a 
baseline projection of Arctic geopolitics if all stakeholders stay on their current course 
with respect to policy, capability and importance. After a detailed examination of the 
base case output and how it was analyzed by the research team, this thesis will next 
explore five alternate scenarios. These scenarios include the best hypothetical strategies 
from the U.S./NATO position—the induction of Sweden and Finland into NATO, Danish 
diplomatic engagement of Russia, and a U.S. buildup of Arctic operating capacity. Next, 
we will explore the largest threat strategies that Senturion has indicated are available to 
Russia: diplomatic engagement and strengthening relationships with Canada, and a 
worst-case scenario in which Russia is able to co-opt several stakeholder nations into an 
exclusive Arctic agreement. The exploration of these scenarios should confirm or refute 
their likelihood and feasibility and allow us to draw conclusions on the best course for 
U.S. Arctic policy and strategy and the greatest threats within the region moving forward.  
A. SCENARIO 1: THE ARCTIC “BASE CASE” 
The base case model of Arctic geopolitics shows the most likely outcome if 
current posture, relationships and power dynamics remain unchanged. The first task when 
modeling with Senturion is to establish an issue continuum on which all possible 
outcomes are included. For this thesis, the issue to be modeled is “control of the Arctic”; 
we intend this term in its broadest possible definition, including legal, political and 
economic control of the region, but weighted most heavily toward physical and military 
control. On one end of the spectrum is an equitable balance of power among Arctic 
stakeholders in which all of the Arctic states reap optimal benefit from the region and 
there is no substantial military threat or likelihood of conflict (See Figure 7). This might 
include an international agreement on demilitarization similar to the one established for 
the Antarctic region. Based on the stakeholders’ Arctic policy objectives, this position is 
most desirable to all parties other than Russia. 
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The opposite end of the issue continuum is an Arctic region that is fully controlled 
and dominated by Russia. This is a possibility, considering the trajectory of current 
Russian military buildup in the Arctic when compared to the other Arctic states, Russian 
Arctic policy objectives and the Russian claim to the Lomonosov Ridge, which is 
currently under review by the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf. Russian dominance of the region across all domains would be 
problematic for the rest of the international community in a multitude of ways, ranging 
from energy security and economic considerations to the threat of nuclear war. Figure 7 
depicts the issue continuum as it appears in the Senturion software. 
Figure 7.  Senturion Issue Continuum Established for Modeling 




The next step in the modeling process is to input the importance and influence 
scores that were established in Chapter III. Figure 8 depicts the initial positions and 
importance of the Arctic states.  Figure 9 depicts the initial positions and influence of the 
Arctic states, and Figure 10 depicts the initial positions and importance multiplied by 
influence for each Arctic state. 
Figure 8.  Senturion Initial Importance Graph and Table, 




Figure 9.  Senturion Initial Influence Graph and Table, 
“Control of the Arctic” 
 
Figure 10.  Senturion Initial Importance Multiplied by Influence Graph and 
Table, “Control of the Arctic” 
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With all data entered, we ran the base case scenario to model the likely outcome 
of the current trajectory of Arctic control. The round-by-round flow of stakeholders and 
positions is depicted in Figure 11. 
Figure 11.  Senturion Modeling of the Base Case, “Control of the Arctic,” 
Rounds 1–7 
 
The final results of the simulation are shown in Figure 12.96 
                                                 
96 In the terminology of the software’s calculations, a round is an exchange of information (knowledge 
about other stakeholders’ positions) between all stakeholders. Given stakeholders’ initial positions, 
Senturion predicts how they will shift their positions in response to all other stakeholder proposals. In other 
words, a round assumes that each stakeholder has heard the “offers” of every other stakeholder and has had 
time to process the relative benefits of each (see Senturion Manual, 85). Subsequently, stakeholders accept 
credible offers that minimize change from their initial positions. The Senturion algorithm then takes these 
new stakeholder positions and iterates the process to simulate negotiation dynamics. In the real world, a 
round is a contextually defined measure of time. The larger the situation, such as the international 
negotiations to be modeled for the Arctic, the longer a round takes (Senturion Manual, 85). Given the lack 
of official head-of-state meetings on the Arctic, our best measure of what realistically constitutes a round is 
the two-year cycle in which chairmanship of the Arctic Council rotates. During each two-year period, the 
Arctic council typically meets four times, but it has yet to progress or create policy at the same pace.  
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Figure 12.  Senturion Modeling of the Base Case, “Control of the Arctic,” 
Final Positioning 
 
After 10 rounds of simulation, the model indicates that each Arctic stakeholder 
will come to rest along the continuum in a position where it can no longer be compelled 
further, and the issue will be as close to a consensus as it can be.  
Figure 13 provides a numeric version of the line graph; the position shifts for each 
stakeholder round by round, and the shading of the text and the cells has meaning and is 
very important when attempting to identify strategies.97 When a box is shaded orange, it 
indicates that the stakeholder has unrealized leverage during a round that could be used to 
move another stakeholder toward the desired position. When a box has bold red 
numerals, it indicates that the stakeholder is in conflict, with other stakeholders on both 
sides of the current position attempting to lever the targeted stakeholder toward their own 
positions.98 
                                                 
97 Senturion Forecasting LLC, Senturion Analyst Guide Government Version 5.2, 104. 
98 Ibid., 125. 
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Figure 13.  Senturion Round-by-Round Table of Positions, “Control of the 
Arctic,” Base Case 
 
A stakeholder-by-stakeholder analysis of the Arctic base case will provide 
indications of likely “current course” outcomes and potential unrealized leverage, 
strategies, and threats for each. 
1. United States 
The United States’ initial position is at the absolute bottom of the continuum. As 
depicted in Figure 10, the U.S. does not have major leverage in the Arctic, due to 
relatively low scores in both importance and influence. As the model progresses, the U.S. 
is swayed several times to the Norwegian position on the continuum at 25 before settling 
back to a five at the conclusion of 10 rounds.  
Interestingly, the U.S. movement toward the median is a result of leverage 
executed by Sweden, Finland and Norway. Norway is a NATO ally, and Sweden and 
Finland are typically considered closer to NATO than to the Russian sphere of influence, 
but the modeling is consistent with observations that Arctic cooperation with Russia is 
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often symbiotic for these three states. The 2010 Barents Sea Treaty between Norway and 
Russia establishes a delimitation between the nations’ economic exclusion zones and 
provides a framework for resource sharing to include the continuation of the Norwegian-
Russian Joint Fisheries Commission.99 Finland has been and is engaged in joint 
shipbuilding ventures with Russia, to include the production of high-tech Arctic vessels, 
and the two nations have discussed a larger Finnish-Russian Arctic Partnership that 
would include joint development of the Barents Sea Shelf and marketing of the Northern 
Sea Route.100 Similarly, Sweden has been weighing the benefits of its Arctic cooperation 
with Russia against the prospect of joining NATO and remains undecided between the 
two positions. 
The model indicates that these three states will attempt to persuade the United 
States toward a more moderate position and to accept a larger degree of Russian control 
within the Arctic Region. At the end of the simulation, the United States position is 
moved back to a five by Canadian influence. As indicated by the lack of orange boxes in 
Figure 14, at no point during the simulation does the United States have unrealized 
leverage on another Arctic state.  
Analysis of the Senturion output illuminates several potential strategies for 
optimizing the U.S. end state in the Arctic: aggressively engaging the pivotal states of 
Norway, Sweden and Finland toward a larger diplomatic agreement in the Arctic; 
leveraging all influence to pull Finland and Sweden into NATO as soon as possible; and 
expanding military and infrastructure capability in the Arctic to increase American 
influence in the region. These potential strategies will be modeled and tested later in this 
chapter.  
 
                                                 
99 Tore Henriksen and Geir Ulfstein, “Maritime Delimitation in the Arctic: The Barents Sea Treaty,” 
Ocean Development & International Law 42, no. 1–2 (2011): 9. 
100 Thomas Nilsen, “Finland Expands Arctic Cooperation with Russia,” Barents Observer, February 
10, 2011, http://barentsobserver.com/en/sections/arctic/finland-expands-arctic-cooperation-russia. 
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2. Russia 
In the Arctic base case, the model indicates that Russia will initially be compelled 
toward the middle of the continuum, characterized by a reasonable balance of power and 
international cooperation. Ultimately, though, Russia will settle at a 38, a position that 
translates to hesitant cooperation with the other Arctic stakeholders while still 
maintaining an advantage in the physical and military domains and likely resisting the 
Arctic proposals or interests of the other stakeholders. The model indicates that Russian 
military dominance in the Arctic will be somewhat muted or surpassed by diplomatic 
persuasion when it comes to affecting outcomes. The model shows Russia with several 
rounds of unrealized leverage to move other states toward its position.  
The largest unrealized and potentially threatening Russian leverage is toward 
Canada. This may seem surprising, but a December 2015 analytic seminar wargame 
conducted by this research team indicated that this leverage may exist. Canada and 
Russia share a common interest in establishing full legal sovereignty of their territorial 
waters and economic exclusion zones. Such internationally recognized sovereignty would 
give Canada de facto control of the Northwest Passage and Russia full control of the 
Northern Sea Route, the two commercial shipping routes emerging as the High North 
melts (see Figure 4). The economic benefits of this would be significant, and the 
Canadian government would be very likely to consider Russian diplomatic offers to 
bilaterally recognize this and support one another. A simulation in which Russia 
maximizes its leverage against Canada will be conducted later in this chapter to test the 
possible outcome of that scenario.  
3. Canada 
Due to the importance that Canada places on the Arctic region, it is the strongest 
stakeholder on the lower end of the issue continuum and is not moved off of its position 
at any point in the 10-round base case simulation. Canada uses its influence to bring 
Russia, Sweden, Finland and even Norway toward its preferred position. There is some 
unrealized leverage for Canada in the later rounds of the simulation, but this has 
insignificant impact on the final output. In the base case, Canada executes its optimal 
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strategy and plays the most significant role among the NATO countries in anchoring the 
position and pressuring Russia toward international cooperation. The takeaway from the 
analysis of how Canada behaves in the model is that the U.S. should continue to bolster 
or increase support to Canada on all Arctic matters. 
4. Norway 
The Norwegian position remains largely unchanged at 25 on the continuum 
throughout the base case model. This is consistent with the real-world Norwegian Arctic 
policy and position. Norway will likely continue to straddle the line between the benefits 
of deeper international cooperation in the Arctic, NATO allegiance, and a bilateral Arctic 
relationship with Russia in which Norway makes moderate concessions to Russia in order 
to reap the maximum benefit for itself.  
5. Denmark 
The Danish position begins at a five on the continuum and never wavers, despite 
multiple failed attempts by Russia, Sweden and Finland to move it toward a more 
moderate position. The model indicates that Denmark has significant unrealized leverage 
to move Russia toward the lower end of the continuum in the first two rounds; we will 
explore the real-world existence of this leverage and a test of this strategy for Denmark 
later in this chapter.  
6. Iceland 
Like Denmark’s, the Icelandic position remains steady throughout the base case 
simulation at a five on the continuum. Despite the importance of the Arctic region to 
Iceland, the Icelandic position is one of the weakest due to its lack of military capability. 
The model indicates that Iceland may possess minor unrealized leverage toward Russia, 
Finland and Sweden in round two, but the effect of exercising this leverage is negligible 
on the final outcome of the scenario, and we will not explore it any further.  
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7. Finland 
The simulation indicates that aside from Russia, Finland has the greatest potential 
to be moved toward the lower end of the continuum. Finland begins at a position of 50 
and is moved by multiple stakeholders to a final position of 26, despite efforts by Russia 
to keep it from moving toward the NATO states. Finland does have unrealized leverage 
to move the United States, Iceland and Denmark toward the Russian position, and this 
will be explored later in the chapter in a “worst-case scenario,” where Russia is able to 
pull Finland and Sweden away from NATO and into an alliance. 
8. Sweden 
Sweden moves from an initial position of 50 down to a final position of 34. Due 
to relative weakness, Sweden has minimal leverage against other stakeholders, and 
execution of its unrealized leverage does not affect the scenario outcome. This being said, 
Sweden, like Finland, is still a pivotal player in the Arctic dynamics and will be part of 
the alternate modeling of Sweden and Finland as part of NATO and conversely as part of 
an Arctic alliance with Russia. 
The base case Senturion modeling of Arctic control has demonstrated some 
interesting trends, hypotheses and areas for further exploration. As with any abstract 
modeling application, the indicated strategies should be “sanity checked” against reality 
and then modeled and analyzed for feasibility.  
The overall outcome of the base case indicates that if the current course trajectory 
remains, the next 20 years will show Russia moving sharply toward international 
cooperation in the Arctic, though ultimately Russia, Sweden, Finland and to a lesser 
degree Norway will remain resistant to a true balancing of Arctic powers or strong 
cooperation in diplomatic and economic matters in the region. The model also indicates 
that the United States has significantly less leverage over the other Arctic states than it 
typically does in international affairs and that Canada is the true NATO powerhouse and 
anchor when it comes to Arctic influence. The base case model has provided insight into 
several possible strategies that could significantly alter the outcome of the issue in favor 
of various stakeholders.  
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B. MODELING ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS IN SENTURION  
With the base case scenario established, the five previously mentioned alternate 
scenarios will be modeled by adjusting the inputs to the base case scenario in the 
Senturion program. The flow chart in Figure 14 describes the methods available for 
accomplishing this.  
Figure 14.  Senturion Flow Chart for Identifying Strategies to Optimize 
Client Outcomes101 
 
The diligence process referred to in this flowchart refers to the data development process we 
described in “Determining Initial Data Set” in Chapter III. 
The two methods of manually changing the simulation to test strategies and 
outcomes are to exercise unrealized leverage and to change starting positions. Exercising 
unrealized leverage simulates one stakeholder targeting another stakeholder during a 
particular round to attempt to move them toward the first stakeholder’s position; a change 
                                                 
101 Senturion Forecasting LLC, Senturion Analyst Guide Government Version 5.2, 14. 
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in starting position simulates a stakeholder taking action to negotiate the movement of 
another stakeholder toward the preferred position. Starting positions are changed by 
altering the importance, influence or initial position in the data tables prior to running the 
simulation, whereas unrealized leverage is exercised during each round of the simulation. 
In the alternate scenarios simulated below, both methods are used during testing.  
C. TESTING POSSIBLE UNITED STATES STRATEGIES 
In this section, three possible United States strategies identified by the initial 
Senturion base case will be investigated in detail. 
1. Scenario 2: Finland and Sweden Join the NATO Alliance 
The first strategy tested was a scenario in which the United States and NATO 
convince Sweden and Finland to apply for NATO membership and NATO votes to 
induct these states. For the purpose of the simulation, it is assumed that this move could 
be conducted in less than two years, or one round of the Senturion simulation. To adjust 
the model to accurately portray how this would affect control of the Arctic, the positions 
of Sweden and Finland were adjusted in the first round from a 50 to a 25, not bringing 
them all the way into low-end positions but leaving them on par with Norway, another 
NATO member with closer Arctic ties to Russia.  
Interestingly, once moved half the distance closer to the majority NATO sphere of 
influence, Sweden and Finland, along with Norway, are all immediately persuaded down 
to the position of the other NATO Arctic states at around five on the continuum (see 
Figure 15). Then, between rounds two and three, the consolidated position of 
international cooperation among the seven Arctic states who are also NATO members 
exercises enough leverage to move Russia all the way down to the position of consensus 
at the lower end of the continuum. Of all the alternate scenarios tested in Senturion, this 
one came the closest to reaching consensus on the issue of Arctic control (see Figure 16). 
These results and their likelihood and applicability to real-world Arctic geopolitics will 
be explored in Chapter V.  
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Figure 15.  Senturion Modeling of Finland and Sweden Joining NATO, 
Rounds 1–7 
 





2. Scenario 3: Danish Diplomatic Engagement Drives Russia toward the 
Preferred Position 
The base case model indicated that Denmark possesses significant unrealized 
leverage to move Russia toward the U.S./NATO preferred position in the first and second 
rounds. The research team explored this to determine whether any real-world leverage in 
fact exists for Denmark with Russia. Denmark is an Arctic nation only by way of 
Greenland, a massive resource potential. Denmark and Russia have made geographically 
overlapping claims to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf for a 550,000-square-kilometer area of the Arctic that includes the North Pole.102 
Because the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is 
expected to take until 2019 to rule on the various claims of the Arctic nations, Russia has 
made several overtures to Denmark attempting to establish a bilateral agreement with a 
line of delimitation between them.103 Russia is seeking an agreement similar to its 2010 
Barents Sea Treaty with Norway that will expedite the recognition of what it claims as 
sovereign territory by extending the underwater continental shelf. This scenario certainly 
implies that Denmark has real leverage to compromise with Russia and move Russia 
toward the position of international cooperation in the Arctic by agreeing to a mutually 
accepted delimitation line. While the Barents Sea Treaty likely moved Norway closer to 
the Russian sphere of influence, a delimitation treaty between Denmark and Russia may 
have the opposite effect and pull Russia toward cooperation with the other Arctic nations.  
The Senturion model was manually altered to simulate Denmark exercising this 
leverage against Russia in the first round of the simulation. In the base case, Russia is 
moved from 100 to a position of 38 in the first round. With Denmark now executing the 
unrealized leverage, Russia is compelled to a position of 18 at the conclusion of the first 
round, significantly closer to the U.S./NATO preferred position (see Figure 17). As a 
result of the change in the Russian position, Sweden, Finland, and Norway move lower as 
well, and the simulation concludes with all eight Arctic nations within 12 points of a 
                                                 




consensus, ranging from five to 17 on the issue continuum (see Figure 18). This indicates 
that a possible United States strategy may be to encourage Denmark to diplomatically 
engage with Russia and establish a bilateral agreement on delimitation well before the 
United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf publishes its findings. 
This strategy incurs risk by encouraging recognition of Russian territorial claims, but the 
potential to compel Russia into international cooperation in the Arctic as a result may be 
worth it. 
Figure 17.  Senturion Modeling of Denmark Exercising Unrealized Leverage 
against Russia, Rounds 1–7 
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Figure 18.  Senturion Modeling of Denmark Exercising Unrealized Leverage 
against Russia, Final Positioning 
 
3. Scenario 4: United States Builds up Arctic Operating Capacity to 
Match Russia 
The fact that the United States has no notable leverage on other Arctic nations in 
the base case simulation stood out as a concern during the analysis. Though the reality of 
larger global affairs clearly indicates that the United States does in fact have leverage 
over the other stakeholders through other avenues and geographic areas, the research 
team was interested in the lack of leverage indicated by Senturion, so we ran an alternate 
scenario in which the United States builds Arctic operating capacity in the military, 
industrial and commercial domains to reach parity with Russia, to see how this would 
change the outcome of the simulation without changing any other factors. 
To simulate this move, we increased the United States’ initial influence score to 
be equal to Russia’s and did not alter the importance score or any other data in the model. 
The results are displayed in Figure 19. 
 54 
Figure 19.  Senturion Modeling of a U.S. Arctic Operating Capacity Increase 
to Match Russia, Final Positioning 
 
The results of this alternate scenario indicate that a large U.S. investment in 
operating capacity to meet the Russian buildup would actually be counterproductive to 
reaching a consensus position toward international cooperation. The final positions of 
Russia, Sweden, Finland and Norway are farther away from the other Arctic nations than 
they are in the base case. This indicates that a U.S. Arctic buildup may in fact cause a 
polarization of Arctic nations into two camps, with no real agreement on international 
cooperation. The underlying cause of this can be seen in the model by observing the 
perceptions of each stakeholder from round to round. With increased influence on the 
lower end of the continuum, the United States is actually perceived by Russia, Sweden 
and Finland as a hostile threat, putting these three stakeholders in a “conflict” status with 
the United States throughout the majority of the 10-round simulation. This simulation 
supports many existing opinions and hypotheses that a rush to build operating capacity in 
the Arctic, particularly in the military domain, is counterproductive to reaching an 
optimal outcome for all Arctic nations.  
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D. TESTING POSSIBLE RUSSIAN STRATEGIES TO DOMINATE THE 
ARCTIC REGION 
In this section, two possible Russian strategies identified by the initial Senturion 
base case will be investigated in detail. 
1. Scenario 5: Russian Diplomatic Engagement and Strengthening 
Bilateral Relationship with Canada  
The base case simulation indicated that Russia had significant unrealized leverage 
to move Canada off its position at the lower end of the issue continuum. When observing 
real-world Arctic geopolitics, Russian leverage against Canada is certainly not intuitive; 
however, the Senturion indicator coupled with a similar result during a High North 
seminar wargame conducted by the research team in December 2015 suggest the 
possibility of such leverage should be explored further. 
Though staunch allies, a potential rift exists between the U.S. and Canada in the 
Arctic region. As Scott Borgerson and Michael Byers wrote in an article for the Wall 
Street Journal, “Canada claims the channels between its Arctic islands that connect the 
Atlantic Ocean to the Beaufort Sea north of Alaska are the country’s ‘internal waters.’ 
The U.S. maintains that the waterway is an ‘international strait’ through which ships and 
aircraft from all countries have a right of uninterrupted ‘transit passage.’”104 The 
implications of this disagreement are large when considering the potential economic 
benefit to Canada of having full control of one of only two Arctic transit routes. If the 
United States and Canada fail to resolve this Northwest Passage dispute in a timely 
manner, Russia may use it to attempt to drive a wedge between the two allies. 
Similar to Canada, Russia is seeking international recognition of its territorial 
claim to the vast majority of the Northern Sea Route. Legal sovereignty over the 
Northern Sea Route would allow Russia to tightly control the route and reap economic 
benefits from its use while further dominating the Arctic. Due to the fact that both Russia 
and Canada are seeking territorial claims on the same basis, the potential for bilateral 
                                                 
104 Scott Borgerson and Michael Byers, “The Arctic Front in the Battle to Contain Russia,” Wall 
Street Journal, March 8, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-arctic-front-in-the-battle-to-contain-russia-
1457478393. 
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agreement and recognition of one another’s claims is feasible and mutually beneficial. It 
could lead to further bilateral Arctic cooperation between the two nations, to the 
exclusion of other Arctic nations. 
To model this scenario in Senturion, Russia’s unrealized leverage targeting 
Canada was executed in the first round. While Russia still moved from 100 to 38, Canada 
was compelled upward to a position of 36 (see Figure 20). Russia, Canada, Sweden and 
Finland held around this number through the rest of the simulation, and the final 
positioning placed Russia, Canada and Sweden around a 40, Norway and Finland 
approximately halfway at 25, and the U.S., Iceland and Denmark at five (see Figure 21). 
This result can be translated to a lack of consensus, lack of broad stakeholder 
cooperation, and an unlikely Arctic partnership between Russia and Canada that would 
be a significant threat to United States interests. The best method for the United States to 
counter this potential Russian strategy would be to aggressively seek settlement 
concerning the U.S. and Canadian dispute over the Northwest Passage.  
Figure 20.  Senturion Modeling of Russia Exercising Unrealized Leverage 
with Canada, Rounds 1–7 
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Figure 21.  Senturion Modeling of Russia Exercising Unrealized Leverage 
with Canada, Final Positioning 
 
2. Scenario 6 (Worst-Case Scenario): Russia Leverages Canada, 
Sweden, Norway and Finland into an Exclusive Arctic Partnership 
The base case model indicated that in addition to its early-round unrealized 
leverage toward Canada, Russia has leverage against Norway, Sweden and Finland. For 
the worst-case scenario, we assumed that Russia could maximize its leverage against all 
four states to pull them toward a position that supports Russian interests and deliberately 
excludes the United States. We manually manipulated the model for Russia to execute all 
unrealized leverage round by round (see Figure 22).  
The real-world precedence for this scenario is not as well-grounded as the 
previous alternative scenarios; however, it is still a reasonably possible outcome. The 
final positioning of this simulation shows a Russian-dominated Arctic region, with 
Canada and the Nordic states complicit with Russian dominance (see Figure 23). On the 
lower end of the continuum, the United States, Denmark and Iceland hold a position of 
five, but international cooperation in the Arctic including all eight stakeholders is highly 
unlikely. The key takeaway from this alternative scenario is that the United States must 
remain diplomatically engaged with all of the Arctic nations. It also reinforces the idea of 
Sweden and Finland as pivotal states for the future of geopolitics in the emerging 
High North. 
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Figure 22.  Senturion Modeling of a “Worst-Case Scenario”: Russia Utilizes 
All Leverage to Build Position, Rounds 1–7 
 
Figure 23.  Senturion Modeling of a “Worst-Case Scenario”: Russia Utilizes 
All Leverage to Build Position, Final Positioning 
 
 59 
V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
A. OVERALL STRATEGIC UTILITY OF THE HIGH NORTH 
As the High North emerges as a vital strategic area of interest and climate change 
continues its current trajectory, there will be greater access to the High North, which will 
elevate its global importance. The High North will be increasingly important to 21st-
century geopolitics. As sea ice continues to rapidly retreat, the Arctic will emerge as the 
nexus of scientific exploration and resource expansion.  Competition for natural resources 
previously covered by ice are now becoming more accessible and in higher demand. This 
melting of ice will create new trade routes between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans that 
will become passable in the next generation. This accessibility for all will keep the High 
North in center crosshairs as countries compete for access to the wide range of minerals 
in the region. 
B. SUMMARY OF SENTURION ANALYSIS AND COURSES OF ACTION 
Throughout this project, six scenarios were run multiple times each, using 
Senturion to forecast the most likely geopolitical development of the Arctic in the coming 
decades. In addition, an effort was made to identify the best possible outcome for United 
States policy objectives and national interest, as well as the worst-case scenario for the 
United States.  
In order to conduct the simulations with as much accuracy and rigor as possible, 
the research team collected data from a wealth of sources and established a framework to 
best translate qualitative information into the quantitative input data required by 
Senturion. The intent of this research is to gain insight by using a relatively new 
wargaming application to assist the United States in understanding strategies and 
identifying threats that are not intuitive and have not been previously identified in detail.  
1. Most Likely Course of Action 
The most likely outcome for the High North over the next two decades of 
development will be characterized by strained and hesitant international cooperation 
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among the Arctic states. The polarity of NATO versus Russia in the larger international 
landscape will likely be the primary constraint to full international cooperation and the 
potential for demilitarization of the Arctic. The simulations conducted with Senturion as 
part of this thesis indicate that Russia can be moved closer to a position of international 
cooperation in the Arctic region, albeit on its own terms and only when it serves Russian 
national interest. Russia owns the largest percentage of Arctic territory and far outpaces 
all other Arctic states in operating capacity within the region in all domains, including 
military. Without a monumental shift in the balance of power, Russia will likely continue 
to exploit its weighted advantage in the Arctic without overtly causing significant conflict 
in the region. The simulation shows that many of the Arctic states, NATO members or 
not, often prefer bilateral diplomacy with respect to the Arctic.  
Recent history has shown and Senturion indicators of likely future agreements 
confirm that when it comes to the Arctic, all states are willing to negotiate with 
traditional adversaries if it best serves their interest. Examples of this would be Norway, 
Sweden, Finland, Canada and Denmark and their indicated willingness to sign bilateral 
Arctic treaties and cooperation agreements with Russia, despite being diametrically 
opposed to Russia in other parts of the world. 
Without further investment in and higher prioritization of the United States Arctic 
interests, the most likely outcome for the United States will be an atmosphere of 
subordination to Russia in the region and a general lack of influence over the other Arctic 
states when it pertains to Arctic issues. The analysis of the Senturion output reveals that 
Russian strategic military domination of the Arctic if the U.S. does not invest in a buildup 
of Arctic capability is highly unlikely. The more likely scenario is one in which U.S. 
interests are marginalized and the U.S. policymakers’ ability to influence the greater 
international community of Arctic states on issues such as economic development and 
environmental protection is hamstrung.  
Overall, the modeling we have conducted with Senturion indicates a mediocre 
status quo outcome for the United States without any major changes to current Arctic 
policy. It is unlikely that a lack of further investment in the Arctic will present any grave 
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danger to long-term U.S. national security, but as alternate-course Senturion simulations 
indicate, some adroit diplomacy may better position the United States in the region. 
2. Optimal United States Course of Action 
The Senturion simulations have indicated several strategies for the United States 
that can optimize the outcome for the U.S. in the Arctic without significant further 
investment of anything other than diplomacy. The first is for the United States to take the 
lead in encouraging Sweden and Finland to apply for NATO membership and to lobby 
support among current NATO members to vote to induct these two nations into the 
alliance. The movement of these two states further into the NATO and U.S. sphere of 
influence would sway Arctic influence in favor of the U.S. position.  
The second indicated strategy for the United States is to encourage its allies, 
namely Denmark, to diplomatically engage Russia and utilize unrealized leverage to 
bring Russia further into the fold of international cooperation in the Arctic, but on U.S. 
and NATO terms. In general, the United States should most likely take the lead in 
pursuing larger international cooperation among the Arctic states and attempt to 
formalize it in signed agreements.  
Our analysis indicates that if the United States uses some or all of these strategies, 
there is a strong potential to reach a U.S.-optimal Arctic outcome in the next 20 years 
without excessive financial or resource investment. This outcome would be characterized 
by large-scale formalized international cooperation amongst the Arctic states, perhaps 
turning the Arctic Council into an actual legal body, and maximizing the potential of the 
Arctic for all of its stakeholders while preventing aggressive exploitation by non-
stakeholders such as China and India.  
3. Worst-Case United States Course of Action 
At the opposite end of the continuum of potential Arctic outcomes is a Russian-
dominated Arctic. In the Senturion modeling of this scenario, our analysis shows that 
Russia can diplomatically leverage first Canada and then Sweden, Finland and Norway 
away from the United States’ position and toward its own. These nations would be 
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willing to make larger concessions to Russia and would enter significant diplomatic 
agreements that further strengthened the Russian position in the Arctic. With control of 
these other stakeholders, Russia would have relatively free reign of the Arctic, and U.S. 
influence and deterrence would be minimized.  
The best U.S. counterstrategy to likely Russian strategies that would produce this 
outcome is to build up bilateral and multilateral Arctic cooperation agreements with the 
nations indicated as vulnerable to Russia. This includes settling the ongoing Northwest 
Passage dispute that the United States has with Canada and ties back to the strategies of 
engaging the Nordic states and attempting to pull them closer to the U.S. with respect to 
Arctic matters. 
C. FUTURE POLICY IMPLICATIONS IN THE HIGH NORTH 
1. Diplomacy before Military Action 
When we began research on the topic of the emerging High North, much of the 
current event literature indicated that Russian buildup, published rhetoric and actions in 
the region are intended to dominate it in a hostile and militarized way. When we 
compared United States’ and NATO’s Arctic military capabilities and posture to those of 
Russia, our initial hypothesis was that the United States would need to make a significant 
additional investment in Arctic military capability to counter a significant and emerging 
threat. What we found is that significant military conflict or the wielding of military 
might as an instrument of power in the Arctic is not likely.  
Despite the changing climate, the Arctic will remain a formidable and severely 
restrictive environment for military operations, or any operations for that matter. As 
Patrick Arnold, the director of business at the Maine Port Authority, insightfully stated, 
“Before you can kill each other in the Arctic, you have to first be able to survive.”105 
Other factors such as sustainment limitations and a lack of population centers within the 
region, as well as simply its size, make it nearly impossible to assert any type of military 
control. In addition to research, our modeling indicates that military might has a 
                                                 
105 Informal conversation with Patrick Arnold, Director of Business, Maine Port Authority, July 19th, 
2016, Portland, Maine. 
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fractional effect on influence and control within the Arctic Region. When we increased 
the United States’ military capability in our model to be on par with Russia’s, the 
outcome was unexpectedly negative for the United States. Rather than allowing the 
United States to increase influence and pull the other stakeholders toward a position of 
international cooperation, the change further polarized the Arctic stakeholders, pushing 
those already closer to the Russian position further toward it and preventing Russia from 
coming toward the median position preferred by the United States.  
The alternate scenarios that were most successful in moving a consensus of 
stakeholders toward the U.S. position were simulations of diplomatic actions, not kinetic 
or military ones. The larger theme that emerges is that it will be policy and diplomatic 
engagement that sway the future of the Arctic most drastically. Between Russia and the 
United States, the heavyweight who can leverage diplomacy, information and economic 
incentive to best convince the smaller stakeholders to move toward their desired outcome 
is the one who will achieve their objectives.  
2. Preemptive and Aggressive Negotiation Strategies—Pivotal States 
(Sweden/Finland/Norway) 
Our research and modeling indicate that the Nordic States of Sweden, Finland, 
and Norway are the most vulnerable to Russian influence and exploitation in the Arctic 
Region.  As such, they also hold the most leverage to influence Russia towards larger 
international cooperation in the region. For this reason, we want to label these three 
countries as the “pivotal Arctic states,” this is to say that the future geopolitical landscape 
of the Arctic will be profoundly shaped by the direction that these three countries take 
with their Arctic policies and international agreements.   
When seeking the best courses to achieve United States policy objectives and 
positioning in the emerging High North, the U.S. should focus on these three countries.   
3. Private and Public Partnerships 
In order to maximize influence and ensure all stakeholders in the High North 
mutually benefit from the region, it is essential to foster both private and public 
partnerships. Taking advantage of opportunities for trade between ports in the United 
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States and Iceland and Norway opens the window into positively impacting the region. 
Maximizing transportation of food, household goods and various other amenities paves 
the way for exchange of larger-scale resources such as oil, gas and precious resources as 
they become more readily available.  
4. Final Recommendations 
The United States should use diplomacy over all other instruments of national 
power to leverage other Arctic stakeholders into positions conducive to full international 
cooperation and should seek solutions to demilitarize the Arctic, like the Antarctic, in 
order to hold all countries accountable and ensure the best interests of all remain in the 
forefront. Seeking trade opportunities and building partnerships in both public and private 
sectors will increase momentum and position the United States for greater influence in 
the region. Additionally, efforts should focus on resolving current boundary issues and 
addressing Arctic governance as related to emerging issues while creating the requisite 
international conditions for sustainable development to promote human safety and overall 
responsible stewardship of the region.106 
 
                                                 
106 The White House, United States National Strategy for the Arctic Region, May 2013, 2, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf. 
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APPENDIX.  ARCTIC DATA TABLES 
Table 1.   Canada Military Influence—Arctic Data Table111 

















paramilitary force with 
patrol and recon role, 
trained for year-round 
Arctic operations 
15 surface warships 
and 4x conventional 
submarines, all Arctic 
capable but not ice-
strengthened 
 
80x F/A 18 combat 
aircraft 
Intercept bomber and 
recon a/c in Arctic 
1x Arctic Army battalion 
(500 troops) 
Regular Army battalion 
trained for Arctic ops 
5x large icebreakers, 
6x small icebreakers, 
all unarmed, can only 





Support F/A 18 fleet, 
increase range and 
station time 
Small military base 
Alert on Ellesmere 
Island, Nunavat 
Stage and sustain 
troops in the Arctic 
Nanisivik Naval Facility, 
Baffin Island 
Naval base with 
docking and supply 
facilities 




Persistent maritime and 
Arctic patrol 
Arctic training base, 
Resolute Bay, Nunavat 
Train additional Arctic 
units, stage and sustain 




Limited capability to 
monitor underwater 
activity in key Arctic 
choke points, average 
one of four operational 
at a time, cannot 
operate under ice 
Air surveillance radars, 
underwater 
surveillance systems 
Monitor Arctic air and 
sea traffic     
"Polar Epsilon" earth 
observation satellites 
Surveille Arctic region 
with high-resolution 
imagery     
 
                                                 
111 Adapted from Siemon T. Wezeman, Military Capabilities in the Arctic (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012), http://www.iceland.is/ 
iceland-abroad/nato/news/iceland-in-nato/5206/; J. J. Andersson, “The Race to the Bottom: Submarine Proliferation and International Security,” Naval War 
College Review 68, no. 1 (2015), 12–29, http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1626110549?accountid=12702; Trefor Moss, 
“Frosty Relations: Militarizing the Arctic,” World Policy, April 22, 2015, http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/04/22/frosty-relations-militarizing-arctic; 
“Russia Submarine Capabilities,” NTI, June 10, 2014, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/russia-submarine-capabilities/. 
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Table 2.   Denmark Military Influence—Arctic Data Table112 










Score = 15 
3x unarmed maritime 
patrol aircraft 
Limited ISR 




special forces unit 
w/ partly Arctic role 
on Greenland 














Small military patrol 
force on Greenland 
4x Thetis-class 
OPV/frigates 
Capable of breaking 
ice up to 1m thick 
    
1x ice-strengthened 




   
 
 
Royal Danish Navy 
base at Kangilinnguit 
(southern 
Greenland) 






                                                 
112 Adapted from Siemon T. Wezeman, Military Capabilities in the Arctic (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012), http://www.iceland.is/ 
iceland-abroad/nato/news/iceland-in-nato/5206/; J. J. Andersson, “The Race to the Bottom: Submarine Proliferation and International Security,” Naval War 
College Review 68, no. 1 (2015), 12–29, http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1626110549?accountid=12702; Trefor Moss, 
“Frosty Relations: Militarizing the Arctic,” World Policy, April 22, 2015, http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/04/22/frosty-relations-militarizing-arctic; 
“Russia Submarine Capabilities,” NTI, June 10, 2014, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/russia-submarine-capabilities/. 
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Table 3.   Norway Military Influence—Arctic Data Table113 








Score = 25 
6x P-3 long-range 
maritime patrol craft 






heavy mech unit, 







60x F-16 combat 
aircraft 
Very limited range 
outside of Norwegian 
Arctic   
6x Ula-class 
submarines Arctic patrol 
 
  
                                                 
113 Adapted from Siemon T. Wezeman, Military Capabilities in the Arctic (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012), http://www.iceland.is/ 
iceland-abroad/nato/news/iceland-in-nato/5206/; J. J. Andersson, “The Race to the Bottom: Submarine Proliferation and International Security,” Naval War 
College Review 68, no. 1 (2015), 12–29, http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1626110549?accountid=12702; Trefor Moss, 
“Frosty Relations: Militarizing the Arctic,” World Policy, April 22, 2015, http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/04/22/frosty-relations-militarizing-arctic; 
“Russia Submarine Capabilities,” NTI, June 10, 2014, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/russia-submarine-capabilities/. 
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Table 4.   Russia Military Influence—Arctic Data Table114 













Naval, Infantry and 
Army brigade, Kola 
Peninsula 
Winter-trained troops, 
but organized and 
equipped for ops in 
Russia 
Northern Fleet: 
Stationed at several 
large naval and air 




submarines, myriad of 
surface ships 




2x Arctic special 
forces brigades 
Based at Pechenga, 
Kola Peninsula, highly 
capable force for Arctic 
ground operations 
6x large armed ice 
breakers, 4x small 





    





regional impact on 
military conflict in 
Arctic, large strategic 
impact on global 
scale 
    
8x SSGN (guided 
missile) submarines 
Can carry unknown 
quantity of cruise 
missiles, to include 
nuclear armed, 
Russian SOF and 
underwater delivery 
vehicles to insert or 
extract forces 






capable of ASW and 
tactical employment 
in sea engagements 








                                                 
114 Adapted from Siemon T. Wezeman, Military Capabilities in the Arctic (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012), http://www.iceland.is/ 
iceland-abroad/nato/news/iceland-in-nato/5206/; J. J. Andersson, “The Race to the Bottom: Submarine Proliferation and International Security,” Naval War 
College Review 68, no. 1 (2015), 12–29, http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1626110549?accountid=12702; Trefor Moss, 
“Frosty Relations: Militarizing the Arctic,” World Policy, April 22, 2015, http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/04/22/frosty-relations-militarizing-arctic; 
“Russia Submarine Capabilities,” NTI, June 10, 2014, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/russia-submarine-capabilities/. 
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Table 5.   United States Military Influence—Arctic Data Table115 




Ranking = 2 
 
Relative Influence 
Score = 60 
NORAD interceptor 
aircraft, Alaska Intercept air threats 
Several military units with limited cold-weather 
and/or mountaineering training, none 
specialized 
U.S. Navy ships all 
Arctic capable on 
limited basis  
Eielson Air Force 
Base, Fairbanks 
Combat and support 




ground scale basing 
contingency 
  
1x heavy icebreaker, 1x 
inoperable heavy 
icebreaker (dry dock) 
Very limited heavy 




Combat and support 











minimal regional impact 
on military conflict in 
Arctic, large strategic 
impact on global scale 
8–10 Coast Guard 
HC-130 aircraft 
Unarmed Arctic/Bering 
Sea patrol   
4x SSGN (guided 
missile) submarines 
Can carry up to 70 
Tomahawk cruise 
missiles, four SEAL 
platoons, and several four-
man underwater delivery 
vehicles to insert or 
extract forces 






capable of ASW and 
tactical employment in sea 
engagements 
 
                                                 
115 Adapted from Siemon T. Wezeman, Military Capabilities in the Arctic (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012), http://www.iceland.is/ 
iceland-abroad/nato/news/iceland-in-nato/5206/; J. J. Andersson, “The Race to the Bottom: Submarine Proliferation and International Security,” Naval War 
College Review 68, no. 1 (2015), 12–29, http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1626110549?accountid=12702; Trefor Moss, 
“Frosty Relations: Militarizing the Arctic,” World Policy, April 22, 2015, http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/04/22/frosty-relations-militarizing-arctic; 
“Russia Submarine Capabilities,” NTI, June 10, 2014, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/russia-submarine-capabilities/. 
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Table 6.   Iceland Military Influence—Arctic Data Table116 








Score = 10 
 
Fully dependent on 
United States Air 
Force 
N/A Special Unit of the state police 
Minimal capability to 
resist homeland 
invasion for short 
period of time 
Icelandic Defence 
Force 
Defend SLOCS to 
and from the island 
during wartime 








                                                 
116 Adapted from Siemon T. Wezeman, Military Capabilities in the Arctic (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012), http://www.iceland.is/ 
iceland-abroad/nato/news/iceland-in-nato/5206/; J. J. Andersson, “The Race to the Bottom: Submarine Proliferation and International Security,” Naval War 
College Review 68, no. 1 (2015), 12–29, http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1626110549?accountid=12702; Trefor Moss, 
“Frosty Relations: Militarizing the Arctic,” World Policy, April 22, 2015, http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/04/22/frosty-relations-militarizing-arctic; 
“Russia Submarine Capabilities,” NTI, June 10, 2014, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/russia-submarine-capabilities/. 
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Table 7.   Finland Military Influence—Arctic Data Table117 














Specializes in polar 
warfare (small-unit 
level)   
  
Multiple military bases 
in northern Finland 
Train and sustain 
ground and air forces 
for Arctic operations   
 
  
                                                 
117 Adapted from Siemon T. Wezeman, Military Capabilities in the Arctic (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012), http://www.iceland.is/ 
iceland-abroad/nato/news/iceland-in-nato/5206/; J. J. Andersson, “The Race to the Bottom: Submarine Proliferation and International Security,” Naval War 
College Review 68, no. 1 (2015), 12–29, http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1626110549?accountid=12702; Trefor Moss, 
“Frosty Relations: Militarizing the Arctic,” World Policy, April 22, 2015, http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/04/22/frosty-relations-militarizing-arctic; 
“Russia Submarine Capabilities,” NTI, June 10, 2014, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/russia-submarine-capabilities/. 
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Table 8.   Sweden Military Influence—Arctic Data Table118 
STAKEHOLDER AIR ASSETS AIR CAPABILITIES LAND ASSETS LAND CAPABILITIES SEA ASSETS SEA CAPABILITIES 
SWEDEN 
Ordinal Military 




Score = 25 
 
24x Gripen fighter jet 
aircraft 






infantry and ranger 
regiment capable of 
conducting a diverse 
set of missions in the 
Arctic climate 
  
Lueleau Arctic Air 
Base 
Stage and sustain 
defensive troops in 
Swedish Arctic 
territory 
    
 
  
                                                 
118 Adapted from Siemon T. Wezeman, Military Capabilities in the Arctic (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012), http://www.iceland.is/ 
iceland-abroad/nato/news/iceland-in-nato/5206/; J. J. Andersson, “The Race to the Bottom: Submarine Proliferation and International Security,” Naval War 
College Review 68, no. 1 (2015), 12–29, http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1626110549?accountid=12702; Trefor Moss, 
“Frosty Relations: Militarizing the Arctic,” World Policy, April 22, 2015, http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/04/22/frosty-relations-militarizing-arctic; 
“Russia Submarine Capabilities,” NTI, June 10, 2014, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/russia-submarine-capabilities/. 
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Table 9.   Overall Scoring Distribution—Arctic Data Table119 














                                                 
119 Adapted from Siemon T. Wezeman, Military Capabilities in the Arctic (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012), http://www.iceland.is/ 
iceland-abroad/nato/news/iceland-in-nato/5206/; J. J. Andersson, “The Race to the Bottom: Submarine Proliferation and International Security,” Naval War 
College Review 68, no. 1 (2015), 12–29, http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1626110549?accountid=12702; Trefor Moss, 
“Frosty Relations: Militarizing the Arctic,” World Policy, April 22, 2015, http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/04/22/frosty-relations-militarizing-arctic; 
“Russia Submarine Capabilities,” NTI, June 10, 2014, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/russia-submarine-capabilities/. 
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CANADA 2 7 2 7 22 2 
DENMARK 
(GREENLAND) 4 6 1 8 12 3 
NORWAY 7 4 4 4 1 8 
RUSSIA 16 2 70 1 52 1 
UNITED 
STATES 0.5 8 12 2 10 4 
ICELAND 100 1 3 6 1 8 
FINLAND 12 3 6 3 1 8 
SWEDEN 7 4 4 4 1 8 
 
                                                 
120 Adapted from Mäenpää, Ilmo. “Comparative analysis of Arctic economies at macro level.” The economy of the north (2008). 
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